Neighborhoods and banking by Jeffrey M. Lacker




he economic condition of some of our low-income neighborhoods is
appalling. Are banks responsible? Critics blame the banking industry
for failing to meet the credit needs of poorer neighborhoods. Some
claim that bankers pass up worthwhile lending opportunities because of racial
or ethnic bias. Others argue that a market failure causes banks to restrain lending
in low-income neighborhoods. They claim that joint lending efforts by many
banks in such neighborhoods would be proﬁtable, but no single bank is willing
to bear the cost of being the pioneer.
The central statute regulating the relationship between bank lending and
neighborhoods, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA, or “the Act”),
was inspired by the critics’ view that banks discriminate against low-income
communities.1 The Act directs the bank regulatory agencies to assess the extent
to which a bank meets “the credit needs of its entire community, including low-
and moderate-income neighborhoods.” In a similar spirit, the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) requires depository institutions to disclose mortgage
originations in metropolitan areas by census tract. The annual HMDA reports
routinely show large disparities in mortgage ﬂows to minority and white neigh-
borhoods, bolstering the critics’ case.
Defenders of the banking industry attribute the disparity in credit ﬂows to
differences in the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, information that is
This article originally appeared in this Bank’s 1994 Annual Report. The author has beneﬁted
from comments by Marvin Goodfriend, Tom Humphrey, Tony Kuprianov, Stacey Schreft,
and John Weinberg. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reﬂect
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 I will use the term “banks” throughout to refer to commercial banks and thrifts. Credit
unions are currently exempt from the CRA.
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unavailable from the HMDA reports. They view the CRA as a burdensome
interference in otherwise well-functioning credit markets and as a regulatory
tax on banking activity. They argue that the decay of low-income neighbor-
hoods, while deplorable, is beyond the capacity of the banking industry alone
to repair.2
The CRA is currently attracting renewed attention. Public release of ex-
panded HMDA reports, along with widely publicized research suggesting bank
lending discrimination, has sparked complaints that banks neglect low-income
neighborhoods. Critics now assert that regulators have been too lax in imple-
menting the CRA, and they press for regulations based on measures of bank
lending in low-income neighborhoods. In response, federal banking agencies
recently adopted revisions to the regulations implementing the CRA that would
base a bank’s assessment in part on quantitative measures of lending in low-
income neighborhoods (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
1994). Banks’ defenders argue that the regulations were already too burden-
some and that numerical measures inevitably will come to resemble lending
quotas. Banks will be induced to make loans to uncreditworthy borrowers,
risking losses to the deposit insurance funds and, ultimately, to taxpayers.
This essay reexamines the rationale for the CRA. A reconsideration seems
worthwhile in light of the dire condition of our poor neighborhoods on the one
hand, and the demonstrable risks to banks and taxpayers on the other. After
a review of the empirical literature relevant to critics’ claims, I will argue
that there is little conclusive evidence that banks fail to meet the credit needs
of low-income neighborhoods per se. Instead, the CRA regulations should be
understood as a transfer program, aimed at redistributing resources to low-
income neighborhoods. The basic goal of the CRA to improve conditions in
distressed neighborhoods is obviously a worthy one. But the lending and com-
munity investment obligations impose an implicit tax on the banking indus-
try for which there is little justiﬁcation. Nonproﬁt community development
organizations (CDOs) also redistribute resources through subsidized lending in
low-income neighborhoods and represent an alternative to imposing a poten-
tially unsustainable burden on banks. Directing investment toward low-income
neighborhoods could be better accomplished by carefully subsidizing existing
institutions that specialize in community development, rather than by imposing
a burdensome and potentially risky implicit tax on the banking system.
2 I will use throughout the essay the less cumbersome term “low-income neighborhoods”
to refer to the low- and moderate-income neighborhoods that are the focus of the CRA. The
newly proposed CRA regulations deﬁne low-income neighborhoods as census tracts with median
household income less than 50 percent of the median household income of the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA). Moderate-income neighborhoods are deﬁned as census tracts with median
household income between 50 and 80 percent of the median household income of the MSA.         
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1. DO BANKS REDLINE?
The legislative history of the Community Reinvestment Act makes clear that the
Act was based on the premise that banks engage in “redlining.” Senator William
Proxmire, principal sponsor of the CRA, deﬁned redlining during debate on the
Senate ﬂoor:
By redlining...Ia mtalking about the fact that banks and savings and loans
will take their deposits from a community and instead of reinvesting them in
that community, they will invest them elsewhere, and they will actually or
ﬁguratively draw a red line on a map around the areas of their city, sometimes
in the inner city, sometimes in the older neighborhoods, sometimes ethnic and
sometimes black, but often encompassing a great area of their neighborhood.3
The term “redlining” dates back to the 1930s, when the Home Owners
Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
used detailed demographic and survey analysis to classify city neighborhoods
for lending risk.4 The agencies adopted standardized appraisal and under-
writing practices that embodied the common real estate practice of the time
of rating neighborhoods in part on the basis of their current and prospec-
tive racial and ethnic composition (Jackson 1985). Blocks with the lowest of
four grades were color-coded red on secret maps. A 1939 FHA Underwriting
Manual warned that “if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary
that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial
classes.”5 While government agencies retreated from explicitly racial policies
after the 1948 U.S. Supreme Court decision against racial deed covenants,
neighborhood racial composition apparently continued to affect appraisals into
the 1970s.6
As evidence of continuing redlining, legislators cited the results of numer-
ous studies in the early 1970s by community groups and local governments.
The availability of HMDA data in the mid-1970s spurred further redlining
research in the academic and policy communities. Although critics often cite
discrimination against older or lower-income neighborhoods, research has ad-
dressed almost exclusively redlining on the basis of a neighborhood’s racial
composition. The studies documented large disparities in mortgage lending
activity, which led critics of banks to conclude that they had unfairly restricted
3 Congressional Record, daily ed., June 6, 1977, S. 8958, cited in Dennis (1978). Senator
Proxmire’s deﬁnition of redlining also reﬂects the doctrine of localism in banking—the idea that
the savings of a community should be invested locally rather than where returns are highest. See
Macey and Miller (1993) for a critique.
4 See Woelfel (1994) for a description of the HOLC and the FHA.
5 Quoted in Jackson (1985), p. 207.
6 In 1977 the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers removed discriminatory racial
references from their textbook as part of an agreement settling a federal lawsuit. See Art (1987),
p. 1078.     
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loan supply in predominantly minority neighborhoods and thus had failed to
serve the credit needs of their communities.7
This ﬁrst-generation research failed to show, however, that supply rather
than demand was responsible for the lending disparities. A basic premise of the
redlining hypothesis is that banks curtail the supply of credit to a neighborhood
for noneconomic reasons such as racial composition. Many factors that inﬂu-
ence the demand for mortgage credit by qualiﬁed borrowers also vary across
neighborhoods: income and wealth levels, owner-occupancy rates, and housing
turnover rates, for example. Moreover, many of these factors are known to
be correlated with the racial composition of a neighborhood. Without control-
ling for differences in the demand for credit, there is little one can say about
constraints on the supply of credit to minority neighborhoods.
Subsequent redlining research sought to remedy this problem using in-
formation on the economic characteristics of neighborhoods and individual
loan applicants. When such information is taken into account, mortgage ﬂows
and loan approval rates appear unrelated to neighborhood racial composition.
For example, Schill and Wachter (1993) estimate models of banks’ loan ap-
proval decisions. In their simplest model, the neighborhood racial composition
is signiﬁcantly related to approval probability, but when neighborhood charac-
teristics such as median income, vacancy rate, and age of the housing stock are
included, neighborhood racial composition is no longer important. Similarly,
Canner, Gabriel, and Woolley (1991) ﬁnd that after controlling for individual
and neighborhood measures of default risk, there is no evidence of discrimi-
nation based on the racial composition of neighborhoods. Several other studies
conﬁrm these ﬁndings.8 Research thus has failed to uncover any evidence that
banks discriminate against neighborhoods on the basis of racial composition.9
7 See Canner (1982) and Benston (1979) for surveys.
8 See Avery and Buynak (1981), Holmes and Horvitz (1994), King (1980), Munnell et al.
(undated), and Schill and Wachter (1994). Some studies have reported evidence of redlining, but in
these the controls for individual characteristics are limited or absent. Bradbury, Case, and Dunham
(1989) use data at the neighborhood level, but they employ a problematic credit ﬂow variable
that includes commercial as well as residential transactions. They do not control for individual
economic characteristics. Calem and Stutzer (1994) also use neighborhood-level data, and so do
not control for individual economic characteristics. Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1993) rely on
HMDA data and census tract information, and so are unable to control for applicant wealth or
creditworthiness. Although it is conceivable that future research will turn up evidence of redlining,
it seems unlikely; the fact that studies with better controls for individual economic characteristics
obtain smaller or negligible estimates of the effect of racial composition on mortgage outcomes
suggests that the estimates we have are biased upward.
9 Critics also have charged that banks redline older and lower-income neighborhoods (see
Art [1987], for example), but age of the housing stock and borrower income are both plausibly
related to lending risk. As a result, statistical research of the type referred to above is unable
to distinguish between legitimate underwriting practices and redlining these neighborhoods. I am
unaware of any attempt to disentangle the two.        
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2. DO BANKS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS?
Redlining is distinct from racial discrimination against individuals because not
all minority applicants live in redlined neighborhoods.10 Although research has
found little evidence of discrimination against minority neighborhoods, recent
research has uncovered evidence consistent with discrimination against individ-
ual minority loan applicants. The most widely publicized evidence comes from
the HMDA data. In 1989, Congress amended the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act to require lenders to report the disposition of every mortgage loan appli-
cation, along with the race or national origin, gender, and annual income of
each applicant. Numerous press reports have focused on the disparities between
whites and minorities in the fraction of applicants denied credit. For example,
the 1993 data show that for conventional home purchase loans, 34 percent of
African-American applicants and 25 percent of Hispanic applicants were denied
credit, while only 15 percent of white applicants were denied credit (Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council 1994).
By themselves, however, simple tabulations of HMDA data are inconclu-
sive for the same reason that raw mortgage ﬂow data are misleading. The
HMDA data report applicant income, but not credit history or other economic
characteristics. Without controlling for applicant creditworthiness, the disparity
in mortgage loan denial rates in the HMDA data could reﬂect the disadvan-
taged economic status of minorities, rather than noneconomic discrimination
by banks. It is well known that racial and ethnic groups differ signiﬁcantly
on many dimensions of creditworthiness. For example, the average minority
individual has lower income, lower net worth, and lower ﬁnancial asset hold-
ings than does the average white American. Furthermore, minority mortgage
applicants are more likely to have adverse credit histories and to request larger
loans relative to property value, factors associated with higher default risk.11
In short, differentiating between racial discrimination and racial disparities in
creditworthiness is difﬁcult.
10 For example, in 1992, 39.2 percent of minority individuals lived outside of census tracts
in which over half of the population was minority (derived from Canner, Passmore, and Smith
[1994]).
11 On racial disparities in income and economic status, see, for example, Kennickell and
Shack-Marquez (1992), Jaynes and Williams (1989), or the Symposium in the Fall 1990
issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Munnell et al. (1992) report that loan-to-value
ratios and adverse credit history variables are higher for minority applicants; see also Carr and
Megbolugbe (1993). Canner and Luckett (1990) report that households headed by a minority are
signiﬁcantly more likely to have missed a debt payment, even after controlling for other household
characteristics.      
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3. THE BOSTON FED STUDY
A recent study by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has gone
the farthest toward solving this problem.12 They asked banks and mortgage
companies for detailed information from the loan applicant ﬁles for a sample
of Boston HMDA data for 1990. They obtained data on housing expenses, total
debt payments, net wealth, credit and mortgage payment histories, appraised
property values, whether properties were single- or multi-family dwellings,
whether applicants were self-employed, and whether applicants were denied
private mortgage insurance. Combining this information for a sample of 3,062
individual applicants with applicant race and the unemployment rate in the
applicant’s industry, they estimated the probability of a particular mortgage
loan application being denied.
The study’s major ﬁnding is that after controlling for the ﬁnancial, em-
ployment and credit history variables they were able to observe, race still had
a highly signiﬁcant effect on the probability of denial. The results imply that
minority individuals with the characteristics of an average white applicant have
a 17 percent denial rate compared to an 11 percent denial rate for white appli-
cants with the same characteristics. Moreover, the Boston Fed study suggests
that whatever discrimination takes place is of a subtle form. Whereas applicants
of all races with unblemished credentials were almost certain to be approved,
the study found that the vast majority of applicants had some imperfection. As a
result, lenders have considerable discretion to consider compensating factors in
evaluating creditworthiness. The Boston Fed researchers suggest that “lenders
seem more willing to overlook ﬂaws for white applicants than for minority
applicants” (Munnell et al. 1992, p. 3).
These ﬁndings are consistent with the widely held view that lending dis-
crimination is common in housing markets. A recent survey found that 69
percent of African Americans and 33 percent of whites do not feel that African
Americans have an equal opportunity for credit loans and mortgages. Housing
discrimination also has been the focus of housing market audit studies, in which
matched pairs of testers, one white and one minority, respond to advertisements
for rental or sales properties. Such studies have found evidence of differential
treatment based on race, such as African Americans not being shown certain
available properties. The few pilot studies on home mortgage lending discrim-
ination at the pre-application stage are too small to be conclusive. Anecdotal
reports of lending discrimination are sometimes cited as well.13
12 See Munnell et al. (1992).
13 The survey data are from National Conference (1994). On audit studies in housing, see
Fix and Struyk (1993), but particularly the critique by Heckman and Siegelman (1993). Cloud
and Galster (1993) survey home mortgage lending audit studies, along with anecdotal reports of
lending discrimination. The application of audit methodology to lending discrimination is inhibited       
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4. INTERPRETING THE BOSTON FED RESULTS
Although anecdotes and evidence from audit studies are suggestive, the Boston
Fed study remains the most rigorous evidence available of home mortgage
lending discrimination.14 Despite the study’s sophistication, however, consid-
erable uncertainty remains concerning its interpretation. Some researchers have
questioned the reliability of the data and the empirical model underlying the
study.15 Although the critiques are far from deﬁnitive, replication of the study’s
results using different data sets obviously would increase conﬁdence in its ﬁnd-
ings. Seldom is a single retrospective study taken as conclusive, particularly in
the social sciences, and the Boston Fed study is the only research on lending
discrimination that explicitly controls for individual applicants’ credit history.
Further research would be especially valuable in view of the plausible alterna-
tive hypotheses that are consistent with the Boston Fed results.
One such alternative view is that the variables in the study measuring
creditworthiness are imprecise or incomplete and fail to capture completely
the judgment of a hypothetical unbiased loan ofﬁcer. If there is any random
discrepancy between applicants’ true creditworthiness and their creditworthi-
ness as measured by model variables, there is likely to be a bias in measuring
discrimination. When true creditworthiness is inaccurately measured, it is very
difﬁcult to distinguish racial discrimination from unmeasured racial disparities
by laws prohibiting applying for a mortgage under false pretenses. Audit methodology is thus
limited to the more subjective problem of differential treatment at the pre-application stage.
14 Several redlining studies examined data for outcomes of individual mortgage applications.
Some found that minority applicants were less likely than whites to obtain a mortgage loan, even
after controlling for neighborhood economic characteristics. See Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman
(1993), Shafer and Ladd (1981), Canner, Gabriel, and Woolley (1991), and Schill and Wachter
(1993, 1994). None of these studies controlled for applicant credit history, and so they suffer
from the same omitted-variable problem that plagues the analysis of the HMDA data. In related
research, Hawley and Fujii (1991), Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991), and Duca and Rosenthal (1993),
using data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, ﬁnd that after controlling for individual
characteristics, minorities are more likely than whites to report having been turned down for
credit. Information on individual creditworthiness was quite limited, however, again leaving these
studies vulnerable to the omitted-variable problem.
15 Horne (1994) reports on reexaminations of some of the loan ﬁles at the FDIC institutions
participating in the study. Although he reports a large number of data errors, he does not re-
estimate the model, so no conclusion is possible about the effect of those errors. In addition, ﬁles
were selected for reexamination in a way that would bias any reestimation. Liebowitz (1993)
claims in an editorial page essay in The Wall Street Journal that correcting selected data-coding
errors eliminates the ﬁnding of discrimination, but Carr and Megbolugbe (1993) and Glennon and
Stengel (1994) document that the discrimination ﬁnding persists after systematic data-cleaning,
suggesting bias in the way Liebowitz corrects errors. See also Browne (1993a). Zandi (1993)
claims that omission of a variable assessing whether the institution reports that the applicant met
their credit guidelines was responsible for the estimated race effect. Carr and Megbolugbe (1993)
conﬁrm that including this variable reduces the estimated race effect somewhat, but note that
this subjective assessment by the lending institution is signiﬁcantly related to an applicant’s race,
even after controlling for the objective economic characteristics of the applicant. See also Browne
(1993b). Schill and Wachter (1994) also study the Boston Fed data set.     
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in creditworthiness. If true creditworthiness is associated with applicant race,
the model will indicate that race affects the probability of denial, even if race
plays no direct causal role. If true creditworthiness is lower on average for
minority applicants, then there will be a bias toward ﬁnding discrimination
against minorities.16
The fact that measured creditworthiness is statistically associated with race
suggests that this condition holds. Regulatory ﬁeld examiners report that it is
often difﬁcult to ﬁnd matched pairs of loan ﬁles corroborating discrimination
detected by a statistical model or summary statistics. Examination of applicant
ﬁles often reveals explanatory considerations that are not captured by any model
variables. The credit history variables in the Boston Fed study are simple func-
tions of the number of missed payments or whether the applicant ever declared
bankruptcy, and do not reﬂect the reasons for any delinquencies. Evaluating
explanations of past delinquencies is at the heart of credit underwriting; some
will indicate poor ﬁnancial management skills or unstable earnings, while others
will reﬂect response to unusual one-time ﬁnancial shocks or inaccurate credit
reports. It seems quite plausible, therefore, that the Boston Fed ﬁndings are
an artifact of our inability to capture complex credit history information in a
tractable quantitative representation.
Another hypothesis consistent with the evidence from the Boston Fed study
is that minority borrowers are more likely to default than equally qualiﬁed white
borrowers, so lenders implicitly use race as an indicator of creditworthiness in
marginal cases, above and beyond the information provided by income, balance
sheets, or credit history. Such behavior, often called “statistical discrimination,”
might be economically rational, though still illegal. The statistical discrimina-
tion and measurement error hypotheses are closely related because both assume
that the outside analyst does not observe true creditworthiness. The distinction
is that under the measurement error hypothesis the loan ofﬁcer observes true
creditworthiness, while under the statistical discrimination hypothesis the loan
ofﬁcer does not directly observe credit quality but uses race as a proxy.
A recent study of mortgage default data supports these alternative expla-
nations. The study found that an African-American borrower is more likely to
default than a white borrower, even after controlling for income, wealth, and
other observable borrower characteristics.17 Why would a minority borrower
16 If a true explanatory variable is measured with noise, its regression coefﬁcient will be
biased toward zero. In that case, any other variable correlated with the true explanatory variable
will be signiﬁcant in the regression, even though it may play no direct causal role in explaining the
behavior in question. Thus, measurement error is a very serious problem in statistical inference.
See Johnston (1963) for a discussion of measurement error and Cain (1986) for a discussion of
the implications for detecting discrimination.
17 Berkovec et al. (1994) use data on more than a quarter of a million FHA mortgages
originated during 1987–1989. Their data do not include information on the borrower’s credit
history, but they estimate that including credit history would reduce the estimate of the race effect     
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be more likely to default than an equally qualiﬁed white borrower? Mortgage
defaults often are attributable to “trigger events,” such as involuntary job loss or
large unexpected health care costs, that sharply reduce the borrower’s ability
to repay.18 Most people are poorly insured against such risks, and it seems
plausible that minorities experience these events more often than whites.19 For
example, unemployment rates are higher for minorities than for whites, but
more important, the probability of involuntary job loss is higher for minori-
ties (Jackson and Montgomery 1986; Blau and Kahn 1981; Flanagan 1978).
Minority household holdings of ﬁnancial assets are far smaller on average,
reducing their ability to withstand uninsured ﬁnancial shocks (Kennickell and
Shack-Marquez 1992). Minorities tend to be less healthy on average and are
more likely to lack health insurance (National Center for Health Statistics
1994). There seems to be no research on whether these differences in the
likelihood of trigger events persist after controlling for income, wealth, credit
history, and other factors observable at the time of the application. But it seems
plausible that these risk factors can explain the disparity in mortgage default
rates and can thereby account for disparities in loan approval rates. This line
of reasoning suggests that disparities outside lending markets—in labor mar-
kets, for example—might well be responsible for what appears to be lending
discrimination.20
One other consideration that lends support to these alternative explanations
of the Boston Fed results is the presumption that competitive forces should act
to eliminate unproﬁtable discriminatory practices. If some lenders discriminate
on noneconomic grounds, they ought to systematically lose business over time
as long as there are some lenders that do not discriminate. The discriminatory
lenders may end up serving only part of the market, but nondiscriminatory
lenders would be eager to ﬁll the void.21
To summarize, the empirical evidence on bank lending discrimination based
on an applicant’s race seems inconclusive. A skeptic with a strong prior belief
in the ability of market forces to restrain unproﬁtable discrimination could
easily remain unconvinced by the Boston Fed study. On the other hand, critics
by only 30 percent. Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1979, 1983) and Evans, Maris, and Weinstein
(1985) also show that race is signiﬁcantly related to default probabilities, but the omission of
important variables weakens the interpretation of their results.
18 See Quercia and Stegman (1992) for a review of recent literature on mortgage default.
19 Cochrane (1991) reports evidence that households are poorly insured against involuntary
job loss and long-term absences due to illness.
20 See Jaynes (1990) for a survey of the labor market status of African Americans.
21 Calomiris, Kahn, and Longhofer (1994) suggest that a lack of “cultural afﬁnity” between
white loan ofﬁcers and minority applicants may explain ﬁndings of discrimination. A lack of
afﬁnity might reduce the reliability and accuracy of loan ofﬁcers’ subjective evaluations, leading
to higher standards for African Americans at predominantly white banks. The cultural afﬁnity
hypothesis, however, has trouble explaining the higher rejection rates found at minority-owned
banks.       
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with a strong prior belief in the prevalence of lending discrimination will ﬁnd
striking conﬁrmation in the Boston Fed study. Between these two extremes lies
a range of reasonable assessments.22
What does the empirical evidence on discrimination, such as it is, imply
about appropriate public policy? Discrimination against mortgage applicants on
the basis of an individual’s race calls for vigorous enforcement of fair-lending
laws. However, the lack of evidence of discrimination against neighborhoods
per se raises questions about the need for a lending obligation aimed at neigh-
borhoods. Not all minority applicants have low incomes or live in low-income
neighborhoods, so the connection between racial discrimination against individ-
uals and lending to low-income neighborhoods is doubly obscure. The evidence
that we do have, which suggests the possibility of racial discrimination against
individuals but not neighborhoods, provides little reason for a law like the CRA
that targets lending to low-income neighborhoods.23
5. IS THERE SOME OTHER SOURCE
OF MARKET FAILURE?
Lacking evidence of bank discrimination against neighborhoods, is there some
other rationale for a government-imposed lending obligation? Could CRA-
induced lending be socially desirable even though banks would otherwise ﬁnd
it unproﬁtable? In other words, is there a market failure affecting lending in
low-income neighborhoods?24
Many writers have pointed out that low-income housing markets are fre-
quently characterized by “spillover effects” because the physical condition and
appearance of one property affects the desirability of nearby properties. This
leads to a strategic interaction among property owners; improvements to a
house in a well-maintained block are worthwhile but would have little value if
the rest of the block is poorly maintained or vacant. A run-down neighborhood
might be worth renovating from society’s point of view, yet no single property
owner has an incentive to invest. This strategic interaction extends to potential
lenders as well. Each bank judges an applicant in isolation, ignoring the effect
on nearby properties. Taking the poor condition of neighboring properties as
22 Public policy toward neighborhoods and banking could be aided greatly by research on
the root cause of mortgage defaults: Why is it that trigger events such as health problems or
involuntary job loss are so poorly insured? Such research might allow us to distinguish between
competing explanations of disparities in credit ﬂows across neighborhoods and ethnic groups.
Furthermore, we might ﬁnd that reducing disparities in the incidence of trigger events is more
effective than afﬁrmative lending obligations that encourage banks to ignore such disparities.
23 For a similar view, see the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (1994).
24 Market failure can occur in situations with spillover effects, since one person does not
have to pay for the effect of their decision on the well-being of others, as when polluters do not
pay for the damage caused by their emissions.     
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given, the loan might appear to be a poor risk, even though simultaneous loans
to improve all properties might be worthwhile. All would be better off if lenders
could coordinate their decisions and agree to lend, since those loans would be
proﬁtable. But in the absence of coordination, each bank’s reluctance to lend
conﬁrms other banks’ reluctance to lend and becomes a self-fulﬁlling prophecy
of neighborhood decline. In these circumstances, a genuine market failure could
be said to occur.25
Spillovers seem quite important in afﬂuent residential and commercial mar-
kets as well. The preeminence of location in valuing suburban homes epitomizes
the importance many homebuyers place on the characteristics of the surrounding
neighborhood. Ofﬁce buildings often are clustered to take advantage of com-
mon services or homogeneity of appearance. What is striking about spillovers
in more afﬂuent real estate markets is that they do not seem to cause any serious
market failure; private market mechanisms seem quite capable of coordinating
investment decisions. For example, suburban housing is often developed in
large parcels of very similar homes, ensuring the ﬁrst buyers that subsequent
investment will not blemish the neighborhood. The development is coordinated
by a single entity that either builds all the homes or enforces homogeneity
through building restrictions and deed covenants.
From this perspective, it is hard to see just what would impede similar
market mechanisms in low-income neighborhoods. A substantial part of the
economic role of a real estate developer is to coordinate investment decisions,
internalizing the spillovers inherent in closely neighboring investments. If a
coordinated investment in a low-income neighborhood is in society’s best in-
terest, why wouldn’t a private developer assemble the capital to ﬁnance the
investment?
Several notable differences between the suburbs and low-income, inner-city
neighborhoods might explain why coordinating investments is more difﬁcult or
costly in city neighborhoods. Low-income urban neighborhoods tend to be
older, higher-density areas, while development in the suburbs is often on virgin
tracts of undeveloped land. Assembling control of the requisite property rights
is arguably less costly for the latter. Another factor affecting the ease of as-
sembling property rights is the higher incidence in the cities of governmental
encumbrances such as rent controls or tax liens. The greater incidence of crime
in urban areas also inhibits development by making it more costly to provide
residents with a given level of security.
Disparities between urban and suburban markets in the costs of coordinat-
ing investments, however, do not necessarily provide a rationale for government
stimulus of low-income community development. The expense of keeping
crime out of a neighborhood, for example, is a real social cost that deserves to
25 Guttentag and Wachter (1980) present this externality argument.   
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be addressed directly, and there is no reason to encourage people to ignore it in
their investment decisions. Similarly, government restrictions on property rights
distort decisions, although usually with the aim of beneﬁting some particular
group. These distortions impose genuine costs, and it is hard to see why we
should encourage people, including lenders, to discount them. In sum, these
very real costs do not, by themselves, represent a market failure.
Lang and Nakamura (1993) describe a more subtle type of spillover. The
precision of appraisals, they argue, depends on the frequency of previous home-
sale transactions in the neighborhood. A low rate of transactions makes ap-
praisals imprecise, which increases mortgage lending risk in the neighborhood,
reducing mortgage supply, and thereby reducing the frequency of transactions.
A neighborhood can get stuck in a self-reinforcing condition of restricted mort-
gage lending and low housing stock turnover. The key impediment to efﬁciency
in this story is the failure of lenders and homebuyers to account for the social
beneﬁt of their transaction on others’ ability to make accurate appraisals in the
future.
While this argument seems theoretically plausible, some important prob-
lems remain. For example, it is not clear what limits this phenomenon to
low-income neighborhoods. Afﬂuent housing markets are quite prone to transi-
tory declines in transactions volume, but rarely seem to get stuck in a depressed
condition. And again, it is not clear why market mechanisms would be unable
to coordinate transactions in low-income neighborhoods as they do in many
other real estate markets. On the whole, then, it seems difﬁcult to argue that
lending in low-income neighborhoods is any more beset by market failures
than lending in afﬂuent neighborhoods.
6. IS REDISTRIBUTION THE PURPOSE
OF THE CRA?
If the CRA cannot be rationalized as a corrective for lending discrimination
or some other identiﬁable market failure, then the CRA must be essentially a
redistributive program that should be justiﬁed by equity rather than efﬁciency
considerations. Indeed, the desire to simply transfer resources to low-income
neighborhoods is understandable in view of their appalling condition. But how
should such a transfer be carried out?
The CRA has been likened to a tax on conventional banking linked to
a subsidy to lending in low-income neighborhoods (White 1993; Macey and
Miller 1993). Although banks are examined regularly for compliance with CRA
regulations and receive public CRA ratings, enforcement relies on the power of
the regulatory agencies to delay or deny an application for permission to merge
with or acquire another bank or to open a new branch. The prospect of having
an application delayed or denied, along with the public relations value of a high      
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CRA rating, provides banks with a tangible incentive for CRA compliance.26
According to this view, by tilting banks’ proﬁt-loss calculations, the CRA reg-
ulations give banks an incentive to make loans they would not otherwise have
made. To the extent that banks are induced to make loans and investments
they would not otherwise have found proﬁtable, the CRA regulations encour-
age banks to subsidize lending in low-income neighborhoods. Investments at
concessionary rates and CRA-related outlays, such as for marketing programs
and philanthropic contributions, directly reduce a bank’s net earnings. The gap
between the cost of these loans to borrowers and what they would have cost in
the absence of the CRA represents a transfer to the low-income neighborhood.
Two questions naturally arise, though, if the CRA is viewed as a redistribu-
tive program. First, why should we provide low-income neighborhoods with
an enhanced credit supply rather than unencumbered cash payments? Second,
why should the banking industry be the source for such transfers?
7. WHY SUBSIDIZE LENDING IN
LOW-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS?
If the goal is to make the residents of low-income neighborhoods better off,
why not provide unrestricted transfer payments? Economists generally argue
that unrestricted income transfers are more efﬁcient than equally costly transfers
tied to particular goods or services. This efﬁciency arises from the expanded
choices available to recipients. Community development subsidies via enhanced
mortgage lending, in contrast, tie transfers to borrowing and homeownership.
Why encourage low-income households to take on more debt? And why should
subsidies to residents of low-income neighborhoods be tied to their ownership
of housing?
A plausible argument can be made for targeting subsidies to low-income
homeowners as a way to rectify the baneful housing and lending policies of
the past. A variety of explicit policies at both public and private institutions in
the ﬁrst half of this century encouraged the ﬂight of white middle-class resi-
dents from inner cities to the suburbs. Metropolitan real estate boards adopted
explicitly racial appraisal standards and attempted to prevent members from
integrating neighborhoods (Helper 1969). The FHA provided a signiﬁcant stim-
ulus to homeownership, but agency underwriting policies and housing standards
strongly favored newly constructed homes in all-white suburbs (Jackson 1985).
It recommended racially restrictive deed covenants on properties it insured until
the Supreme Court ruled them unenforceable in 1948. The banking industry
26 The recent proposed revision to the regulations implementing the CRA would allow reg-
ulators to seek enforcement action in cases of “substantial noncompliance,” the lowest possible
CRA rating.       
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apparently adopted similar underwriting policies (Jackson 1985, p. 203). Some
researchers cite these policies as important in the creation and persistence of
racial segregation and the concentration of poverty in the inner cities.27
This rationale for the CRA invokes the notion of corrective justice, the
normative idea that compensation should be made for past inequities.28 The
discriminatory practices of earlier times depressed the welfare of low-income
minority communities by raising the cost of home mortgages there relative to
more afﬂuent suburban communities, although the lack of evidence of red-
lining in recent years suggests that noneconomic cost differentials have largely
been removed. Subsidies that lower the cost of home mortgage lending in
low-income minority communities—in contrast to unrestricted cash payments—
transfer resources to precisely the same groups that the earlier discriminatory
policies transferred resources from—nearly creditworthy low-income home-
owners. As Peter Swire (1994) notes, “Only a very small subset of the effects
of discrimination [in housing markets] can be traced with enough speciﬁcity
to permit legal redress” (p. 95). Thus, it may be quite difﬁcult to target unre-
stricted income transfers to individuals directly harmed by past discriminatory
practices. Mortgage lending subsidies that mirror the implicit tax of historic
home lending discrimination might be the most efﬁcient way of compensating
those who were harmed.
8. SHOULD BANKS SUBSIDIZE LENDING?
Why should depository institutions be singled out for the afﬁrmative obliga-
tion imposed by CRA regulations? Why do other lending intermediaries such
as mortgage, ﬁnance, and life insurance companies escape obligation? More
broadly, why should ﬁnancial intermediaries bear the burden rather than society
as a whole? Senator Proxmire provided a partial answer when introducing the
original Act by noting that a bank charter “conveys numerous beneﬁts and it
is fair for the public to ask something in return.”29 The CRA, in this view, is
a quid pro quo for the special privileges conferred by a bank charter, which
incidentally explains why the Act links assessment to a bank’s “application for
a deposit facility.” To the extent that CRA obligations are unproﬁtable or are
equivalent to charitable contributions, apparently they are to be cross-subsidized
from the stream of excess proﬁts otherwise generated by the bank charter.
27 See, for example, Wilson (1987) or Massey and Denton (1993). Homeowner preferences
apparently play a role as well.
28 In a paper devoted to legal and economic analysis of the CRA, Swire (1994) discusses
corrective justice as a “noneconomic” rationale for the CRA. He also discusses “distributive
justice,” which would also rationalize transfers but would not necessarily suggest they take the
form of subsidized lending.
29 U.S. Congress (1977), p. 1. See also Fishbein (1993).      
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The difﬁculty with this role for the CRA is that cross-subsidization may
be infeasible (White 1993). The competitive environment facing banks has
changed greatly since passage of the CRA in 1977. Over the last two decades
the legal and regulatory restrictions on competition among banks have been
substantially reduced, a trend that will continue with the implementation of
the Interstate Banking Efﬁciency Act of 1994. Perhaps more important, rapid
changes in ﬁnancial technology are eroding the advantages of banks relative to
nonbank competitors. Consequently, imposing a unique burden on the banking
industry might only diminish banks’ share of intermediated lending. The regu-
latory burden ultimately would fall on bank-dependent borrowers in the form
of higher loan rates and on bank-dependent savers in the form of lower deposit
rates. And to the extent that lending induced by the CRA regulations increases
the risk exposure of the deposit insurance funds, taxpayers who ultimately back
those funds bear some of the burden as well.
Senator Proxmire suggested a practical reason banks are asked to shoul-
der the CRA burden when he remarked that “there is no way the Federal
Government can solve the problem [of revitalizing the inner cities] with its
resources.”30 From this perspective, the CRA imposes a tax on banks to avoid
an explicit general tax increase. But a general tax increase is usually less costly
to society than an equal-sized tax on a single industry because spreading the
burden over a wider base minimizes the resulting distortions in economic ac-
tivity. From this perspective, imposing the CRA tax on banks rather than the
economy as a whole involves an excess social cost.
Compelling banks to provide subsidized lending in low-income neighbor-
hoods might be warranted nevertheless if banks have a unique comparative
advantage in doing so. The cost savings from such a comparative advantage
might justify incurring the excess social cost of the CRA burden on banks. But
if no comparative advantage can be identiﬁed, we ought to consider alternative
means of providing subsidized lending that avoid the excess cost of a tax levied
solely on banks.
9. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS
PROVIDE SUBSIDIZED LENDING
Community development organizations (CDOs) are institutions that promote
investment in target neighborhoods, working closely with homebuyers, private
lenders, businesses, government agencies, and private donors.31 They primarily
30 See U.S. Congress (1988), p. 7.
31 See Wells and Jackson (1993) for a survey of community development lending, and see
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1993) for a survey of community development
lending by banks.      
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arrange loans for development projects and homeowners, and their costs are
generally funded by grants and donations. Their goal of revitalizing decay-
ing neighborhoods matches exactly the avowed purpose of the CRA. CDOs
represent an alternative to channeling subsidized lending through the banking
system.
Neighborhood Housing Services of Baltimore (NHSB) is one such organi-
zation.32 The main focus of the NHSB is promoting occupant homeownership,
improving the physical appearance of neighborhoods, and “stabilizing” the real
estate market. The NHSB has targeted four different Baltimore neighborhoods
since its inception in 1974. Within a neighborhood, it often targets particular
blocks by systematically searching for owner-occupants for each property on the
block. When it ﬁnds a suitable buyer for a property, NHSB often arranges for
extensive renovations, handles the design and bidding, and selects a contractor.
A great deal of the work of NHSB involves lending. It provides exten-
sive education and counseling to help prospective borrowers qualify for loans.
This assistance can involve establishing bank accounts, repairing credit records,
documenting sources of income, learning about home purchase and mortgage
application procedures, and saving for a down payment. Qualiﬁcation often re-
quires a number of sessions lasting nearly a year or more. Counseling serves as
a screening process—NHSB ofﬁcials often talk of seeking a “match” between a
property and a borrower. After the purchase, counselors provide advice to ﬁnan-
cially strapped borrowers and may help them renegotiate payment schedules.
10. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING
IS DIFFERENT
The activities of NHSB are different in many ways from the usual for-proﬁt
home mortgage lending that banks perform. NHSB coordinates a package of
home purchase ﬁnancing for a borrower that is generally more complex than
typical arrangements. A ﬁrst mortgage is obtained, sometimes from a conven-
tional lender, often on conventional terms, but occasionally through a special
mortgage program tailored to low-income borrowers. NHSB also makes ﬁrst
mortgages from its own loan fund. Some NHSB loans are sold in a secondary
market run by a national organization, Neighborhood Housing Services of
America. A second mortgage is usually crucial to the package since borrowers
generally have just a minimal amount of cash. NHSB arranges for the second
mortgage, usually from its own loan fund. Further funding may be available
32 Neighborhood Housing Services of Baltimore, Inc., is a private nonproﬁt organization and
is afﬁliated with a network of over 200 Neighborhood Housing Services organizations nationwide.
NHSB also operates an afﬁliated organization, Neighborhood Rental Services, that renovates rental
property.  
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from a “Closing Cost Loan Program” it administers. Loan terms often are
designed to retire the junior debt ﬁrst before retiring principal on the ﬁrst
mortgage. NHSB ofﬁcials often refer to their supplemental ﬁnancing as “soft
second” money, since they are sometimes willing to reschedule payments if the
borrower suffers an adverse ﬁnancial shock.
The NHSB goes to great lengths to minimize the credit risks posed by its
clients. Extensive information about borrowers emerges in the early counseling
stage. Borrowers are carefully selected for the right “ﬁt” with the property in
the sense that the payments will be affordable. Borrowers generally are required
to save a down payment of at least $1,000, which provides an equity interest
in the home and helps demonstrate the discipline required to manage mortgage
payments. NHSB also closely monitors the neighborhood and encourages close
connections between residents through community clean-up projects, neighbor-
hood organizations, and crime patrols. This helps NHSB learn early on about
a borrower’s ﬁnancial difﬁculty before a costly mortgage default, generally
the last stage of ﬁnancial distress for a conventional borrower. In addition,
renovations are designed in part to minimize the chance of costly repairs—new
furnaces and appliances are often installed, even when existing units satisfy
city housing codes. Active post-purchase counseling helps minimize the ex
post costs of ﬁnancial distress.
Second, the NHSB spends much time coordinating investment in targeted
neighborhoods. A primary goal of NHSB is to achieve a “generally good
physical appearance” in a neighborhood. It tries to develop vacant properties,
rehabilitate existing properties, and improve commercial areas. It encourages
owner occupancy in the belief that owners who occupy their own home spend
more on maintenance and improvements. It tries to inﬂuence local government
spending on amenities such as streets, sidewalks, and public lands. Sometimes
it helps arrange the departure of taverns or other “undesirable” businesses. In
short, much of NHSB’s activity involves trying to overcome just the sort of
neighborhood externalities discussed earlier in this essay.
Third, NHSB lending requires substantial subsidies. Its counseling, moni-
toring, and coordination activities are quite labor-intensive, and home purchase
transactions are often subsidized. Operating and program expenditures are
funded out of federal, state, and local grants and private donations. Ofﬁcials
admit that they often “overimprove” a house, undertaking renovations that cost
more than the resulting increase in market value. NHSB ofﬁcials also recognize
that their second-mortgage loans are not “bankable” in that no private lender
would lend on the same terms. In fact, loans sold to Neighborhood Housing
Services of America, a national umbrella group, are backing for notes sold to
institutional investors who agree to receive a below-market rate of return on
their “social investment.”   
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11. SHOULD BANKS DO COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT LENDING?
The community development lending performed by CDOs is the type of subsi-
dized lending encouraged by CRA regulations. As suggested above, however,
the community development activities of CDOs like NHSB differ in many re-
spects from traditional banking. Do banks have any comparative advantage in
providing community development lending? Furthermore, how many of these
activities are banks capable of performing safely?
First, the concessionary lending done by NHSB seems inappropriate for
insured depository institutions. Although CRA regulations require that lend-
ing be “sound,” the regulations also encourage concessionary investments and
charitable contributions toward community development. Banks get CRA credit
for offering higher loan-to-value ratios and other “more ﬂexible” lending terms,
which can only mean more risky lending terms. In fact, in the newly adopted
CRA regulations, concessionary community development investments are in-
cluded alongside low-income neighborhood lending in assessing CRA com-
pliance. This approach threatens to blur the distinction between concessionary
and for-proﬁt lending and could induce banks to make underpriced or exces-
sively risky loans. In the absence of convincing evidence that banks pass up
economically viable lending opportunities in low-income neighborhoods, the
attempt to stimulate additional bank lending to these neighborhoods risks
saddling the banking industry with a large portfolio of poorly performing
mortgages if it has any effect at all. Since these debts would carry regulators’
implicit imprimatur, forbearance in the event of widespread losses would be
hard to avoid, as in the case of sovereign debt in the 1980s.
Maintaining a clear boundary at banks between concessionary and for-proﬁt
lending is thus crucial to the clarity and integrity of regulatory supervision.
Examiners need to know whether a portfolio is intended to be proﬁtable or phil-
anthropic. Allowing government-insured banks to carry concessionary lending
on their books hides the cost, unless the subsidy is explicitly recognized up front
through higher loan loss reserves or discounting the value of the loan for interest
rate subsidies. Funding concessionary lending explicitly out of retained earn-
ings or bank capital subjects transfers to at least minimal accounting safeguards,
ensures timely recognition of costs, and makes their redistributive nature clear.
Better yet, concessionary community development lending could be conducted
separately through a community development subsidiary of a bank’s holding
company. This would have the advantage of keeping such lending programs
separate from the bank’s conventional lending, making the evaluation of both
portfolios easier.
One impediment to community development lending by banks or bank
holding companies, however, is the extensive counseling that appears crucial
to lending by NHSB and other CDOs. Unlike CDO counselors, bank loan     
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ofﬁcers face regulatory constraints on their ability to communicate with bor-
rowers; under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, they cannot tell an applicant
what to do to qualify for a loan without triggering a formal application with
the required documentation and disclosures. As a result, NHSB counselors
learn far more about borrowers than would bank loan ofﬁcers. Because the
screening inherent in these programs appears to be essential to the viability of
community development lending, banks often contract with community devel-
opment groups to perform pre-application counseling. Thus, even bank holding
company subsidiaries may require external assistance to perform community
development lending.33
Would banks have any comparative advantage in community development
lending that would motivate a community development requirement for banks?
The experience of the NHSB suggests the answer is no. NHSB counselors have
extensive contact with local bank lending ofﬁcers and appear well informed
about specialized loan programs available and the constraints associated with
conventional for-proﬁt lending. In addition, NHSB has extensive contact with
residents through ongoing work with neighborhood associations, and thus some-
times has better information about borrowers than would a bank. If anything,
then, CDOs would seem to have a comparative advantage over banks in the
community development lending encouraged by the CRA regulations.
Banks have made substantial contributions of funds to community devel-
opment, much of it under agreements negotiated with community groups.34 Do
banks have any special advantage at making such contributions? Perhaps their
working involvement with local community development groups helps them
compare and evaluate organizations. Bankers often speak of trying to select
“truly responsible” organizations.35 On the other hand, banks and other lenders
appear to be a minority among NHSB’s contributors. Most are corporations,
individuals, and foundations in the Baltimore area, and it seems unlikely that
they learned about NHSB through joint lending arrangements. Also, the na-
tional network of Neighborhood Housing Services organizations, along with
explicit certiﬁcation programs, assures some uniformity, making evaluation
33 Other community development activities of the NHSB seem difﬁcult for banks as well.
For example, much of the coordinating activity that seems vital to the CDO approach involves
ﬁnding owner-occupants that are viewed as beneﬁcial to the neighborhood. Such discrimination
among buyers or borrowers would pose legal problems for a bank real estate subsidiary.
34 Allen Fishbein (1993) of the Center for Community Change estimates that around $35 bil-
lion has been “committed” by banks and savings and loans since the late 1970s under agreements
with community groups. The banking agencies ofﬁcially view commitments for future action as
“largely inapplicable to an assessment of the applicant’s CRA performance” (Garwood and Smith
1993, p. 260).
35 “Our job, quite frankly, is to choose partnerships with organizations that do not have
hidden agendas, are truly responsible and have an appreciation of our limitations” (Milling 1994,
p. 7).      
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easier for outside investors and contributors. Thus, it is unclear why banks
would have any advantage in evaluating subsidy recipients.
To summarize, there does not seem to be a compelling rationale for impos-
ing a costly lending obligation on banks. Ultimately such an obligation is a tax
on bank-dependent borrowers and depositors. Similarly, there seems to be scant
economic justiﬁcation for looking to banks for the concessionary investments
encouraged by the CRA regulations.
12. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Our low-income neighborhoods nevertheless remain in appalling condition.
Community development lending seems to be a promising way of channeling
resources toward improving conditions in these neighborhoods. The evidence
summarized in this essay, however, suggests that the CRA is not an efﬁcient
vehicle for revitalizing decayed neighborhoods, despite its laudable goals.
An alternative to the CRA is to fund community development subsidies
directly out of general tax revenues. The Community Development Banking Act
(CDBA), signed into law in September 1994, provides federal funding for com-
munity development. This Act creates a new government corporation, called the
Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, charged with providing
ﬁnancial and technical assistance to specialized, limited-purpose community de-
velopment ﬁnancial institutions (CDFIs), and authorizes expenditures of $382
million over four years.36 Explicit appropriation for community development
has distinct advantages over drawing subsidies from banks. Removing the im-
plicit tax burden on banks would reduce existing distortions in ﬁnancial ﬂows
and avoid the risks of concessionary lending. By directing assistance through
organizations that have community development as their sole mission, moni-
toring and evaluation of such assistance would become transparent.
The CDBA leaves considerable uncertainty, however, about important as-
pects of the Fund’s operation.37 For example, the CDBA requires that a CDFI
have “a primary mission of promoting community development,” without deﬁn-
ing the latter term. Other key provisions depend on undeﬁned concepts like
“signiﬁcant unmet needs for loans or equity investments.” More fundamen-
tally, distributing public money to a network of small, information-intensive
36 Funds can be provided in the form of grants, equity investments, loans, or deposits, and
must be matched dollar for dollar by private funds. The Fund is prohibited from holding over 50
percent of the equity of a CDFI and may not provide more than $5 million to any one CDFI during
any three-year period. Up to one-third of the appropriation may be applied toward a depository
institution’s deposit insurance premium. The appropriation covers administrative costs as well.
Many similar efforts have been funded in smaller amounts in the past. See Wells and Jackson
(1993). Macey and Miller (1993) also argue that direct funding of community development would
be superior to the CRA as it is currently implemented.
37 See Townsend (1994) for a critique of an earlier draft of the Community Development
Banking Act.    
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lending organizations can create adverse incentives in much the same way
that deposit insurance can distort bank behavior. Moreover, the oversight and
reporting provisions in the CDBA are notably less detailed than current banking
legislation, and formal regulations have been left to the Fund to establish. Con-
sequently, much will depend on the way in which the CDBA is implemented;
in particular, effective screening and monitoring is essential. Nevertheless, the
CDBA or something similar to it seems to be more promising than the CRA
for dealing with the plight of the nation’s low-income neighborhoods.
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